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NORTH DAKOTA ENTERS THE DUMPING GROUND WARS:
A CASE STUDY FOR INCENTIVE-BASED
REGULATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Every year Americans throw out more garbage but have
fewer landfills in which to bury it.' Cities and states running out of
landfill space, like New York City, must either pay fees of nearly
one hundred dollars per ton for a local landfill2 or ship their waste
elsewhere.' States receiving waste sometimes welcome it for the
fast money it brings,4 but others see the waste as a problem they
do not want but are unable to stop.5
1. Environmental Protection Agency, Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, Final
Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,980 (1991) (amending 40 C.F.R. § 257 and creating 40 CFR § 258).
According to the comments in the final rule, "EPA's most recent data show that in 1988 the
nation generated nearly 180 million tons of municipal solid waste and that this quantity
would likely grow to 216 million tons by the year 2000." Id. (citing ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECrION AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS, SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL IN THE UNITED
STATES (1988)).
Compare with John C. Dernbach, Municipal Solid Waste: Disposal Strategies,
Environmental Regulation, Contracts and Financing, C659 ALI-ABA 233 (1992), available
in WESTLAW, TP-ALL Database at 2. Industrial waste is an even greater problem than
"garbage," otherwise known as municipal solid waste. "[M]ore than 7.6 billion tons of
industrial waste are generated annually, compared to 211 million tons of municipal waste
and approximately 300 million tons of hazardous waste." Id. (emphasis added).
2. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, RECYCLING & INCINERATION: EVALUATING THE
CHOICES 74 (Richard A. Denison & John Ruston eds., 1990) [hereinafter EDF]. Fees to
dump at the Fresh Kills landfill near New York City were approximately $100 per ton in
1990. Id. The Fresh Kills landfill covers 2,200 acres, rises to 155 feet and "is rapidly filling
up." Bruce Van Voorst, The Recycling Bottleneck: Everybody's Doing It. But Where Do All
Those Cans and Bottles Go From Here?, TIME, Sept. 14, 1992, at 53.
On the other hand, "there is a glut of dump space in many parts of the country. That
has driven disposal prices downward and made some operators desperate for [garbage]
volume." Jeff Bailey, Municipal Waste-Disposal Investments Undermined by Federal Court
Rulings, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1993, at A9.
3. Interstate Transport and Disposal of Solid Waste, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Envt'l Protection of the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1990) [hereinafter 1990 Senate Hearing] (statement of New Jersey Sen. Bill Bradley).
Shipping waste out-of-state is not always an advantage. In 1990, New Jersey had an
"average tipping fee for out-of-state disposal [of] ... over $110 per ton." Id. Senator
Bradley said that in the "last eight years, the cost of trash disposal in New Jersey has gone
up an astounding 600 percent." Id. at 9.
4. Richard Woodbury, Get On Board the Sludge Train, TIME, Sept. 14, 1992, at 54. "In
Kimball County, Nebraska, local officials welcomed a hazardous-waste incinerator after
Waste-Tech Services promised a $60 million investment." Id.
5. See 1990 Senate Hearing, supra note 3, at 14 (statement of Louisiana Sen. John
Breaux). "People stood on the rail tracks trying to stop... [a] 63 carload train that came
from Baltimore to Louisiana loaded with sewage sludge... [which the press labeled] the
poo-poo choo choo." Id. "We all remember the horror stories of the garbage barge that
literally sailed in circles for months because no one wanted the garbage barge to land in
their port." Id. Out-of-state investors bought a town dump in Centerville, Indiana, and
trucked in 240 million pounds of garbage-almost 40% from New Jersey-between July 17,
1989 and July 17, 1990. Town residents were upset enough to run a year-long 24-hour-a-
day survey to count incoming trucks and record their license plates. Id. at 11 (statement of
Indiana Sen. Dan Coats).
576 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:575
A number of states which do not want to be dumping grounds
have declared war6 on trash imports, but they have difficulty mak-
ing progress. Private waste haulers and other states that do not
want to or are unable to dispose of their own waste8 have worked
to ensure that waste moves easily between the states.9 North
Dakota, for example, has found itself the target of incinerated
municipal waste ash that Minnesota does not want.1 ° Municipal
Services Corporation (MSC), under contract to dispose of some
Minnesota ash, has shown an extreme to which a waste disposer
may go to win approval of a new landfill site. MSC has offered
$60,000 for community projects each year to the town of Sawyer,
North Dakota, if enough of its 319 residents sign a contract to sup-
port the landfill in their town. However, many residents have
decided to fight against MSC by refusing to sign the contract.'1
Part II(A) of this Note explains the current federal, North
Dakota, and Minnesota laws concerning nonhazardous landfills.
Part II(B) discusses the federally mandated solid waste manage-
ment plans for the states, and compares the plans and goals of a
newcomer to waste management, North Dakota, with an exper-
ienced environmental waste manager, Minnesota. In Part II(C),
6. See 1990 Senate Hearing, supra note 3, at 1.
As the landfills of receiving communities fill up with out-of-state trash, local
communities have decided to take matters into their own hands .... They don't
want their precious and inexpensive landfills sold to the highest bidder, so folks
in States with surplus landfill capacity have declared war against exporting
States.
Id. (statement of Montana Sen. Max Baucus).
7. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice William Rehnquist called the methods for states to limit
waste imports "perverse regulatory incentives," id. at 2018, and "gymnastics." Id. at 2019.
8. 1990 Senate Hearing, supra note 3, at 32. "[E]xporting States had in fact created
incentives for out-of-state disposal and had little or no concern for the resultant impacts in
[the State of final disposal]." (statement of Norman H. Bangerter, Governor of Utah, on
behalf of the National Governors Ass'n).
9. The chief lobbyist for waste service companies is the National Solid Wastes
Management Association, which works against any ban on moving waste between states or
exclusionary fees on out-of-state waste. National Solid Wastes Management Association,
SPECIAL REPORT: INTERSTATE MOVEMENT OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE (February 1992).
10. Steve Brandt, Hennepin to Vote on Paving Test: Experiment Offers Way to Dispose
of Incinerator Ash, MINN. STAR TRIB., Apr. 7, 1992, at 8D (Metro ed.). Concern about
concentrated heavy metals from the incinerator ash persuaded neighbors of the proposed
Minnesota disposal site to "rise up against" the Hennepin County Board to stop a local ash
landfill. Id. The ash disposal company has "an agreement to bury Hennepin County's ash
in a North Dakota landfill." Id.
This agreement, or contract, has expired. Telephone interview, Gloria A. David,
Community Relations Coordinator, Municipal Services Corp. (Aug. 11, 1993). For the
purposes of this Note, the Minnesota Ash contract will be used as a hypothetical example of
out-of-state waste coming to North Dakota.
11. 138 CONG. REC. S10,175 (daily ed. July 23, 1992) (recording statement of North
Dakota Sen. Kent Conrad in a debate on S. 2877, Interstate Transportation of Municipal
Waste Act of 1992).
this Note will discuss the effect of the Dormant Commerce Clause
on the interstate transportation of waste and the resulting difficul-
ties states have in trying to regulate waste imports. Part III(A) uses
the Sawyer landfill as an example to show how waste may come to
North Dakota as a result of less stringent landfill criteria and solid
waste management plans. Impacts on both North Dakota and
Minnesota from the waste imports to North Dakota are discussed
in Part III(B), and Part IV suggests how regulations based on eco-
nomic incentives may offer a realistic solution to the negative
impact on both North Dakota and Minnesota from interstate waste
transport.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF SOLID WASTE LAW
A. LANDFILL CRITERIA
1. Federal
The federal government has not imposed stringent require-
ments for landfills on the states.1 2 Congressional members have
stated that these regulations should be local decisions because,
unlike air and water pollution, which clearly cross state lines with
ease, pollution from a landfill usually affects only a localized area.' 3
Congress first enacted a national regulation, the Solid Waste
Disposal Act (SWDA), for landfills in the 1960s' 4-several years
after enacting regulations to prevent air and water pollution. 5
This early landfill regulation was intended to stop open dump-
ing,' 6 to stop open burning of trash,'" and to enforce compliance
12. Id. at S10,171. "We have very stringent regulations, national regulations, under
the Clean Air Act .... We have very prescriptive, precise national regulations under the
Clean Water Act. Solid waste is intentionally, under our scheme of laws, is [sic] given much
more control by local communities, in combination with the States." Id. (statement of
Montana Sen. Max Baucus).
13. Id. "Landfills ... are essentially very local decisions. It is not like air pollution. It
is not like water pollution, both of which cross State boundaries." Id.
14. Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 983 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988)).
15. The federal Water Pollution Control Act was enacted in 1948, and the federal
Clean Water Act was enacted in 1955. [Federal] Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No.
845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 843 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)); [Air Pollution Control] Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 159, 69 Stat.
322, (1955)), reprinted in 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. 351 (codified amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7671q (1988 & Supp. 1990)).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 6 9 02(aX3) (1988). The regulation's purpose is to "[prohibit] future open
dumping on the land and [to require] the conversion of existing open dumps to facilities
which do not pose a danger to the environment or to health." Id.
17. Dean Rebuffoni, Too Much Waste and Too Little Money; Cleanups May Be
Delayed 5 to 8 Years, MINN. STAR TRIB., Dec. 30, 1991, at lB. "[In] the early 1970s they
[sanitary landfills] were seen as the answer to the air pollution problem created by the
burning of garbage in open dumps." Id. at 3B (emphasis added).
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with the Water Pollution Control Act.' 8 The EPA promulgated
the idea of a "sanitary landfill," in which trash would be buried on
a regular basis.' 9 However, the early SWDA left most other con-
siderations of waste management, landfill design, and operation to
the states.20
In 1976, Congress recognized that the nation was producing
more garbage every year and running out of sanitary landfills in
which to bury it.2 ' Congress passed the Resource Conservation &
Recovery Act (RCRA)2 2 as a scheme to manage national waste by
encouraging recycling and waste reduction and creating two types
of landfills: one for hazardous wastes and another for nonhazard-
ous wastes. 23 RCRA was incorporated into the SWDA, and today
the SWDA is more commonly known as RCRA.
By the mid-1980s, the large number of sanitary landfills on the
National Priorities List for priority cleanup indicated RCRA stan-
18. 42 U.S.C. § 6907(aX2) (1988). By October 21, 1977, the EPA had to suggest
guidelines to control solid waste to protect surface waters from dump water runoff
"through compliance with effluent limitations under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act .... [and to protect] ambient air quality through compliance with... the Clean Air
Act[.]" Id. SWDA was also intended to stop germs from spreading out of open dumps by
providing for "disease and vector control." Id. "Vector control" refers to controlling
disease carriers such as insects. 40 C.F.R. § 241.101(w) (1992).
19. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 241.101(s) (1992). "Sanitary landfill" is defined as:
a land disposal site employing an engineered method of disposing of solid wastes
on land in a manner that minimizes environmental hazards by spreading the
solid wastes in thin layers, compacting the solid wastes to the smallest practical
volume, and applying and compacting cover material at the end of each
operating day.
Id.
20. See, e.g., Ann R. Mesnikoff, Note, Disposing of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Barrier: Keeping Waste at Home, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1223 n.17 (1991). In the early
1970's, "the SWDA retained the 'basic philosophy of the 1965 Act, that the federal
government should play an advisory, and not a regulatory, role." Id. (citing Roger W.
Anderson, The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976: Closing the Gap, 1978
Wis. L. REV. 633, 642).
21. H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6238, 6240 (recognizing the growing amount of trash and the decreasing number of
landfills); 42 U.S.C. § 6901(4) (1988) (noting that "problems of waste disposal ... have
become a matter national in scope...").
The beginning of the 1970's saw the enactment of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 950
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1988)). The purpose of NEPA is to
"encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere
and stimulate the health and welfare of man .... 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
22. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988).
23. E.g., Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988). The primary objective of RCRA was to
provide support for "resource recovery"-recycling--and "resource conservation"-waste
reduction. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(aXl). Today landfills are commonly known as either "Subtitle
C" for hazardous waste, or "Subtitle D" for nonhazardous waste after Subtitles C and D
from the original RCRA.
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dards for landfill design were a failure.24 In response, Congress
amended RCRA, directing the EPA to begin closing loopholes
which left some landfill substances unregulated or allowed states
to have weak landfill criteria.25 However, Congress, at least in the
Senate, can be expected ultimately to rely on states to toughen
their landfill criteria before imposing tougher national
regulations.26
Although federal landfill regulations are constantly chang-
ing,2 7 the regulations for nonhazardous waste landfills have some
common traits. First, the EPA's "Guidelines for the Land Disposal
of Solid Wastes "28 apply "to the land disposal of all solid waste[,] ' 29
except for agricultural, hazardous and mining wastes. 30 The regu-
lations are generally only recommendations for states and other
local, regional, or interstate agencies. 3' Even if the guidelines
have "requirements," each guideline has only recommended pro-
cedures, not required procedures.3 2 Thus, landfills which only
24. See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the
Cleanup of Hazardous Waste, 57 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 197 (1988). "About twenty percent
of the National Priority List (NLP) Superfund sites are or were [Municipal Solid Waste]
disposal facilities." Id. at 212.
The National Priorities List is created annually by the President of the United States,
and it consists of "sites most in need of federal [cleanup] efforts." William B. Johnson,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Hazardous Waste Regulations,
86 A.L.R. 4th 401, § 22 (1991).
25. See Environmental Protection Agency, Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria,
Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978 (1991) [hereinafter PARTS 257/258 FINAL RULE]. Effective
October 9, 1993, the EPA will require additional standards for Municipal Solid Waste
Landfills (MSWLs). Id. For example, the new rules will "promulgate regulations governing
the use and disposal of sewage sludge" under a Clean Water Act mandate. Id. In 1993
alone, several new landfill criteria for hazardous waste will become effective. E.g.,
Environmental Protection Agency, Hazardous Waste Management System: Land Disposal
Restrictions, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,772 (1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 28,628 (1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 20,766
(1992) (all amending 40 C.F.R. § 268); Environmental Protection Agency, Hazardous Waste
Management System: Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste and CERCLA
Hazardous Substance Designation; Reportable Quantity Adjustment, Chlorinated Toluenes
Production Wastes, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,376 (1992) (amending 40 C.F.R. §§ 261, 271, 302). This
later amendment resulted in part from a consent decree imposed on the EPA by
Environmental Defense Fund v. Reilly, Civ. No. 89-0598 (D.D.C. 1991). Id. at 47,377.
26. 138 CONG. REC. S10,175 (daily ed. July 23, 1992). When Sen. Kent Conrad of North
Dakota asked the Senate to help stop interstate waste transportation, Sen. Max Baucus, a
leading advocate of toughening landfill criteria, insisted that North Dakota stiffen its landfill
regulations before asking for Congressional help. Id. at S10,171. As Senator Baucus said,
-'[The] Senator from North Dakota says there is nothing the [North Dakota] Governor can
do. That is not correct. There is a lot North Dakota can do about this [problem ].... Most
other States, I would say 90 percent of the other States in the Nation, have stronger
requirements [for landfills]." Id.
27. See supra note 25 for examples of 1993 changes.
28. 40 C.F.R. §§ 241.100-241.212-3 (1992).
29. Id. § 241.100(a).
30. Id.
31. 40 C.F.R. § 241.100(c) (1992).
32. See 40 C.F.R. § 241.200-1, -2, -3 (1992) (providing that there shall be a
determination of the types of wastes accepted and which wastes need special handling and
recommending procedures to comply with those provisions); 40 C.F.R. § 241.204-1, -2, -3
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meet the recommended procedures can be called "EPA-
approved" until the recommendations become legally required.
33
Second, the EPA "Criteria for Classification of Solid Waste
Disposal Facilities and Practices"34 establishes national minimal
criteria for landfills. 35 If a landfill meets the criteria, it is officially a
"sanitary landfill."' 36 If it does not meet the criteria, it is an "open
dump."'37 States may not allow new open dumps to be built and
must stop currently operating open dumps from receiving more
(1992) (providing that the "location, design, construction, and operation of the land disposal
site" must comply with the applicable Water Pollution Control Act provisions, and
recommending procedures to comply with those provisions); 40 C.F.R. § 241.205-1, -2, -3
(1992) (providing that the "design, construction, and operation of the land disposal site"
must comply with the applicable Clean Air Act provisions and recommending procedures
to comply with those provisions); 40 C.F.R. §§ 241.201-203, 206-212 (1992) (providing
recommended procedures for solid waste exclusion, site selection, design, gas emissions
control, disease vectors, aesthetics, cover material, compaction, safety, and records).
However, states may not allow "open dumps." See infra note 38.
33. In October, 1993, many landfill recommendations will become requirements for
municipal solid waste landfills. PARTS 257/258 FINAL RULE, supra note 25. For an
example of a "state-of-the-art" landfill design, which is beyond an EPA-approved design, see
Figure 1 below, EDF, supra note 2, at 193 (based on an illustration in 52 Fed. Reg. 20226
(1987)).
LANDFILL WITH LEACHATE COLLECTION AND DETECTION
protective
soil or cover cp wste filter medium top liner bottom composite liner
drainage materal 0 drain pipes 0 upper component
0 0 0
primary leachat- low permeability so b lower component
collection & ' ---- (compacted soil)
removal system/-
secondary leachate native soil leaate collection
collection & foundation system sump
removal system
(functions as leack detection)
34. 40 C.F.R. § 257 (1992). The regulations became effective in 1979. Id. at § 257.4.
35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6944(a). "At a minimum, such criteria shall provide that a facility
may be classified as a sanitary landfill and not an open dump only if there is no reasonable
probability of adverse effects on health or the environment from disposal of solid waste at
such facility." Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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waste.38  The criteria are not applicable for all types of solid
waste,3 9 nor do they account for all types of potential hazards.4"
Third, after Congress amended RCRA in 1984 to prevent
hazards from leaking out of landfills, the EPA promulgated regula-
tions with minimum criteria for all municipal solid waste landfills
and controls for sewage sludge.4'
These new rules generally have requirements, as opposed to
recommendations.42 For example, municipal solid waste landfills
must have a program to detect and prevent "the disposal of regu-
lated hazardous wastes."' 43 The corresponding procedures for the
program are requirements, not mere recommendations or guide-
lines.44 This is a significant change in federal regulations over the
old recommended guidelines and criteria, at least for municipal
waste, because it imposes stringent regulations upon some landfill
operators.
The federal requirements, however, still leave some disposal
practices completely to the states. To date, no federal regulations
specifically address the disposal of nonhazardous industrial solid
38. 42 U. S. C. A. § 6943(aX2)-(3). States shall "prohibit the establishment of new open
dumps." PARTS 257/258 FINAL RULE, supra note 25, at 50,979. The prohibition is virtually
toothless because the "EPA does not [generally] have the authority to enforce the
prohibition directly .... However, the 'open dumping' prohibition may be enforced by
States and other persons under section 7002 of RCRA." Id.
39. 40 C.F.R. § 257.1(c) (1992). Exempt facilities and practices include agricultural
wastes such as crop residues, mining wastes to be returned to the mine, and sewage. Id. at
(cX1)-(10).
40. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 257.3- 257.3-8 (1992). The potential hazards generally
recognized in the criteria are dangers related to the siting of the facility such as dangers to
or from floodplains, endangered species, surface water, ground water, land used for the
production of food-chain crops, disease, air, explosive gases, fires, bird hazards to aircraft
and human access. Id. Part 257 criteria, however, do not have any provisions to control
future hazards, such as financial assurance for future cleanup costs, nor do they require
permits.
41. See, e.g., PARTS 257/258 FINAL RULE, supra note 25, at 50,978. The Congressional
amendments, commonly known as the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984
(HSWA), id. at 50,979, "required EPA to revise the existing solid waste disposal criteria for
facilities that may receive household hazardous waste or hazardous waste from small
quantity generators." Id. at 50,981. "HSWA specified that the revised criteria shall be those
necessary to protect human health and the environment and may take into account the
practicable capability of owners and operators of solid waste disposal facilities." Id. The
new regulations will be effective on October 9, 1993, except for subpart G of § 258, which
will be effective April 9, 1994. Id. at 50,978. Subpart G covers financial assurance
requirements for closure and post-closure care. Id. at 51,017.
42. PARTS 257/258 FINAL RULE, supra note 25. Part 258 requires landfill operators to
follow specific criteria for siting, operating, design, ground-water monitoring and corrective
action, closure and post-closure care, and financial assurance. Id.
43. Id. at 51,020. Procedures for excluding hazardous wastes from municipal solid
waste landfills will be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 258.20. Id.
44. Id. The program to exclude hazardous wastes "must include, at a minimum
[rjandom inspections...; [r]ecords...; facility personnel [training]... ; and [n]otification [to
the] State Director . .. if a regulated hazardous waste or PCB waste is discovered at the
facility." Id.
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waste.45 Similarly, the new municipal solid waste landfill rules are
silent on air pollution from municipal landfills.4 6
2. North Dakota
a. Recent Changes in State Solid Waste Law
In 1991, the North Dakota legislature virtually rewrote all of
the state's laws for nonhazardous solid waste.47 The changes
increased the number of regulations for solid waste management
and added new classifications for waste.48 Prior to the amend-
ments, the state did not define "solid waste" to include many types
of potentially dangerous wastes. 49 The amendments directed the
state's Department of Health and Consolidated Laboratories to
45. Telephone interview, William J. Delmore, Assistant Attorney General and Director
of Enforcement, North Dakota Department of Health and Consolidated Laboratories (July
16, 1993).
Some states, such as Texas and Pennsylvania, have already regulated nonhazardous
industrial solid wastes. For a description of Pennsylvania's regulations, see John C.
Dernbach, Municipal Solid Waste: Disposal Strategies, Environmental Regulation,
Contracts and Financing, C65 ALI-ABA 233 (1992) (available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL
Database). Texas has regulated nonhazardous industrial waste since 1970, beginning with
permits and registration. R. Keith Hopson and Susan K. Thompson, Solid Waste
Management in Texas: Semiconductor and Oil/Gas Industry Wastes, A.B.A. SEcTION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND ENVIR. L., RCRA/CERCLA AND PRIVATE
LITIGATION UPDATE, Dec. 10-11, 1992, at Tab I, page 1.
"Industrial solid waste" is defined in Part 258 as "'solid waste generated by
manufacturing or industrial processes that is not a hazardous waste regulated under subtitle
C of RCRA." PARTS 257/258 FINAL RULE, supra note 25, at 51,017. Under Part 258, a
municipal solid waste landfill "may receive other types of RCRA subtitle D wastes, such as
•.. industrial solid waste." Id. at 51,018.
46. PART 257/258 FINAL RULE, supra note 25, at 50,981. However, in 1991, the EPA
"proposed air emission controls for municipal landfills .... " Id. See also 56 Fed. Reg.
24,468 (1991) (proposed rules for "Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources
and Guidelines for Control of Existing Sources: Municipal Solid Waste Landfills").
47. Solid Waste Reduction and Management Act, 1991 N.D. Laws 277 (codified in the
Solid Waste Management and Land Protection Act (SWMLPA) at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-
29-01 to -15 (1991)). The only sections of SWMLPA left unchanged by the 1991 Act were
subsections 23-29-01, -8, -9, -10, -11, -13, and -14. In 1991, the legislature also amended the
state law dealing with hazardous waste, which is beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g.,
Hazardous Waste Law Exemptions Act of 1991, 1991 N.D. Laws 278 (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-20.3-10 (1991)). N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-29-01 to -15 (1991).
48. Explanation and Justification for Proposed Revisions to Article 33-20 of the North
Dakota Administrative Code, at 1 [hereinafter NDAC EXPLANATION] (including definitions
of infectious waste, municipal waste, and special waste).
49. "Solid waste" is defined as:
[A]ny garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material,
including solid, liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous material resulting from
industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from
community activities. The term does not include . . . domestic sewage, . . .
irrigation return flows or industrial discharges that are point sources . or
nuclear . . . material.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-29-03(13) (1991). North Dakota also classifies plastics as a regulated
substance and has adopted rules concerning degradation rates and allowable byproducts.
See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-32-01 to -04 (1991).
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revise rules for the disposal of newly defined infectious waste,50
municipal waste,5 1 and special waste (which includes municipal
ash and industrial waste).5 2
To revise the new rules, the Department followed a
nondegradation policy based on an old state law prohibiting pollu-
tion of state waters.5 3 The law declared a state policy "to act in the
public interest to protect, maintain, and improve the quality of the
waters in the state for the continued use as public and private
water supplies, propagation of wildlife, fish and aquatic life, and
for domestic, agricultural, industrial, recreational, and other legiti-
mate beneficial uses .....5 54 To assure the protection of not only
surface water, but also ground water, the law prohibits waste dis-
posal anywhere it is likely to pollute any state waters.55 The
Department has interpreted chapter 61-28 to mean "that the per-
formance and design standards established for disposal of solid
waste should insure that there is no reasonable probability of
adverse effects."56 This nondegradation policy is the primary justi-
fication for North Dakota adopting more stringent criteria for
landfills than the federal government requires.5 7
To date, the federal government does not have specific landfill
50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-29-03(4) (1991) (defining "[infectious waste" as "solid waste
that may contain pathogens with sufficient virulence and in sufficient quantity that
exposure of a susceptible human or animal to the solid waste could cause the human or
animal to contract an infectious disease").
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-29-03(8) (1991) (defining "[m]unicipal waste" as "solid waste
that includes garbage, refuse, and trash generated by households, motels, hotels, and
recreation facilities, by public and private facilities, and by commercial, wholesale, and
private and retail businesses" but not including special waste).
52. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-29-03(15) (1991). "Special waste" is defined as:
nonhazardous solid waste, including: waste from the combustion or gasification
of municipal waste; waste from industrial and manufacturing processes; waste
from energy conversion facilities; waste from crude oil and natural gas
exploration and production; waste from mineral and ore mining, beneficiation,
and extraction; and waste generated by surface coal mining operations. The
term does not include municipal waste.
Id.
53. See Addendums to: Explanation and Justification for Proposed Revisions to Article
33-20 of the NDAC, at 1-2 [hereinafter NDAC ADDENDUMS] (stating that "the legislature
has clearly established a non-degradation policy .. "); See also CONTROL, PREVENTION,
AND ABATEMENT OF POLLUTION OF SURFACE WATERS, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-28-01 to -
08 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (originally enacted in 1967 as the Pollution of Surface Waters Act,
1967 N.D. Laws 479).
54. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-28-01 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-28-06(lXa) (1985 & Supp. 1991).
56. NDAC ADDENDUMS, supra note 53, at 2 (emphasis added).
57. See id; N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-04.1(2) (1991). For the North Dakota
Department of Health and Consolidated Laboratories to adopt a more stringent regulation
than the federal government requires, the Department must "[make] a written finding
after public comment and hearing and based upon evidence in the record, that
corresponding federal regulations are not adequate to protect public health and the
environment of the state." Id. NDAC EXPLANATION, supra note 48, and NDAC
ADDENDUMS, supra note 53, serve as the "finding" required under this statute.
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criteria for nonhazardous industrial waste or municipal waste
ash.58 Using the nondegradation policy and the new solid waste
definitions, the North Dakota Department of Health proposed
completely new solid waste regulations which became effective on
December 1, 1992.,1 The rules include stiffer required criteria for
landfill liners, leachate collection and removal systems, final cov-
ers, monitoring and inspections, contingency plans, financial assur-
ance, permit fees, and operator certification.60
b. Municipal Ash Disposal Regulations
Although the new state regulations address municipal ash,
North Dakota can be expected to stiffen regulations for municipal
ash disposal. The state has a moratorium on granting permits for
58. See supra note 45 (discussing how some states and the federal government regulate
nonhazardous industrial waste); NDAC EXPLANATION, supra note 48, at 4 (noting that
"federal regulations have not been drafted or promulgated for storage, treatment or
disposal of nonhazardous industrial waste"); William K. Reilly, Environmental Protection
Agency, Memorandum, Exemption for Municipal Waste Combustion Ash From Hazardous
Waste Regulation Under RCRA Section 3001(i), Sept. 18, 1992, at 5 [hereinafter REILLY'S
ASH MEMO] (reprinted as Appendix 4 to Department of Health and Consolidated
Laboratories, Status of Statutory and Regulatory Control of the Management of Industrial
Waste and Municipal Waste Combustion Ash (Oct. 1992) [hereinafter N.D. INDUS. WASTE &
ASH STATUS]). By EPA policy, municipal ash will not be federally regulated under RCRA
Subtitle C landfills for hazardous materials, but will be regulated under RCRA Subtitle D
landfills for nonhazardous materials. REILLY'S ASH MEMO, supra, at 3, 6. Subtitle D has no
specific regulations for municipal ash other than that it may be disposed in a Part 258 MSW
landfill. Id. at 5, n.4.
59. N.D. INDUS. WASTE & ASH STATUS, supra note 58, at 1. "The new State Solid
Waste Management Rules will be codified in [North Dakota Administrative Code] Article
33-20.1" Id. The final regulations were codified as N.D. ADMIN. CODE §§ 33-20-01 to 33-
20-18.
60. Eg. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-20-04.1 (covering general performance standards);
§ 33-20-13 (covering water protection); § 33-20-14 (covering financial assurance); § 33-20-
02.1, 33-20-15 (covering permits and fees); 33-20-16 (covering operator certification).
In 1993, several significant laws relating to solid waste were enacted. H.B. 1005
(allowing counties to vote on whether or not the Department of Health can issue permits
for facilities within their county "based on public interest and impact on the
environment"); H.B. 1057 (requiring counties to zone for "solid waste disposal and
incineration facilities," allowing counties to impose fees on the same facilities, requiring
public meetings for permits unless a hearing has already been held for zoning siting); and
S.B. 1050 (requiring some large-scale commercial landfill and incinerator owners or
operators to pay for a state-employed inspector for their facility).
One new 1993 law, known as the "Bad Boy" bill, was "passed over the objections of
[Municipal Services Corp.] and other waste firms." Sue Ellen Scaletta, New Rules Could
Dash Hopes of Trash Merchants, GRAND FORKS HERALD, August 1, 1993, at lB. The bill
requires the Department of Health to deny permits if applicants have "intentionally
misrepresented or concealed any material fact [required in the application], or judgment of
criminal conviction for violation of any federal or state environmental laws ... within five
years before... the application, or the applicant has knowingly and repeatedly violated any
state or federal environmental protection laws." S.B. 2346. Another bill requires "any
entity that controls the permitholder... to accept responsibility for any remedial measures,
closure and postclosure care, or penalties incurred by the permitholder." H.B. 1445.
On the other hand, the state is establishing a fund paid for by municipal waste landfill
operators and owners to reimburse them for remediation costs incurred beyond "the first
one hundred thousand dollars of [the] cost of corrective actions." S.B. 2214.
For information on more new solid waste laws, see infra notes 61, 70, 110, and 111.
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building or operating landfills disposing of ash from incinerating
municipal solid waste.6 ' The moratorium was valid until April 18,
1993,62 but a state legislative committee has passed a bill draft to
extend the moratorium until January 1, 1995.63
Also, even though the EPA has a policy declaring municipal
ash nonhazardous by keeping it under the RCRA "Subtitle D" def-
inition,64 municipal waste concentrates hazardous substances and
therefore should be classified as "hazardous." 5 North Dakota's
nondegradation policy for state waters and its landfill location
requirement of "no reasonable probability of adverse effects"
could be expected to prompt the Department to promulgate stif-
fer rules for municipal ash disposal in order to prevent water pol-
lution from ash landfills.66
c. Cleanup Costs
Municipalities owning a landfill leaking a nonhazardous sub-
stance by the RCRA definition, but which is hazardous under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) definition,67 may now be liable for
61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-29-07 note (1991).
The 1993 North Dakota legislature extended the ash moratorium until the Department
of Health adopted new rules for municipal ash disposal "or until January 1, 1994, whichever
is earlier. " H.B. 1057, 53rd Leg. Ass., 1993 N.D. Laws 111. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-
29-07 (1993).
New rules have been adopted and became effective August 1, 1993. N.D. ADMIN.
CODE ch. 33-20-10.
The new rules for municipal solid waste ash landfills, which are the same as "large
volume industrial waste landfills," are stiffer than the regulations for other landfills, such as
municipal waste landfills, N.D. ADMIN. CODE ch. 33-20-06.1, and small volume industrial
waste landfills, N.D. ADMIN. CODE ch. 33-20-07.1. Justifications for the differences in the
regulations based on landfill size include the fact that "the Department [of Health] has
determined that quantity of waste and rate of waste disposal has a direct and potentially
adverse impact on the environment." Memorandum from William J. Delmore, Assistant
Attorney General and Director of Enforcement, Department of Health, to Heidi Heitkamp,
Attorney General (May 11, 1993), at 2 [hereinafter DELMORE'S MEMO].
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-29-07 note (1991).
63. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF NORTH DAKOTA, MINUTES OF THE WASTE
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, Sept. 18, 1992, at 2-3. The Ash Moratorium Bill Draft passed
without any votes cast against it. Id. at 3. The North Dakota legislature only meets
biannually, and during the 1992 interim, the legislative council had been under a directive
to study waste disposal emphasizing municipal solid waste ash disposal. Solid Waste
Disposal Facilities Act, 1991 N.D. Laws 283.
64. See supra note 58, REILLY'S ASH MEMO (discussing the EPA policy on municipal
ash disposal). But see infra note 127.
65. EDF, supra note 2 at 177. "[I]ncineration concentrates the metals.. . -- [and] lead
and cadmium, in particular-are readily leachable from ash at levels that frequently exceed
the limits defining a hazardous waste under federal law[.]" Id.
66. See also supra note 61.
67. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. 96-510, 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613-1782 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. vol. 1).
Disposing of solid waste by definition means the waste is "leaking." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3)
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cleanup costs under CERCLA. According to the Second Circuit in
B.F Goodrich Company v. Murtha,8 "a municipality [or state or
other political subdivisions] may be liable as a potentially responsi-
ble party if it arranges for the disposal of hazardous substances.16 9
Since all of North Dakota's forty-five existing municipal waste
landfills are owned by local governments or municipalities, North
Dakota can be expected to stiffen ash disposal regulations to avoid
potential CERCLA liability, since CERCLA is being liberally
construed.7 °
d. Operating Costs
North Dakota has already increased the cost of operating a
landfill in the state. In 1991, the state imposed several new fees
and surcharges.71 Among the new charges are a fee on all landfill
operators, minimum fees on "special use" landfills,72 a monthly
twenty-cent surcharge on municipal waste to be collected from
each household account, and larger amounts for commercial
accounts.73 The money collected from the fees will go to the
Department's operating fund,74 and all money collected from the
surcharge will go to a new Solid Waste Management Fund, to be
(1988). "Congress made 'leaking' a part of the definition of 'disposal' [under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(3)] to meet the need to respond to the possibility of endangerment . United
States v. Waste Indus., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984).
68. 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992).
69. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992). The case dealt
with cities that had generated and collected mostly household waste. Id. at 1197. The
court mentioned that "due to household waste's greater volume and reduced toxicity[,]"
the cleanup costs "may be greater than at similar industrial or commercial toxic waste
sites[.]" Id. However, the court concluded that "burdensome consequences are not
sufficient grounds" to give municipalities an exemption to CERCLA liability due to the
EPA's interpretation of CERCLA. Id. at 1206.
70. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992)
(explaining that "CERCLA is a remedial statute which should be construed liberally to
effectuate its goals").
Banks and other lenders will now have some state protection from third party suits for
environmental damage from leaking landfills. H.B. 1377 (providing lender liability
protection for banks and other lenders). "In the absence of this protection [similar to E.P.A.
rules], banks have been reluctant to lend money to companies which could be involved in
CERCLA cleanups and have been reluctant to retake possession of property which has
been contaminated during the course of the loan period." DELMORE'S MEMO, supra note
61, at 2.
71. Solid Waste Disposal Facilities Act, 1991 N.D. Laws 283. Section 2 imposes fees
"for the issuance of permits or registration certificates for ... disposal facilities." Id. Section
2 of the Solid Waste Surcharge Act requires a surcharge on all household and commercial
generators of trash within North Dakota. 1991 N.D. Laws 284. Households must pay 20
cents per month, and commercial generators must pay between 20 cents and three or more
dollars per month depending on the size of their operators. Id.
72. Solid Waste Disposal Facilities Act, 1991 N.D. Laws 283, § 2. "Applicants for
special use solid waste management facilities shall submit a minimum fee .... ." Id.
73. Solid Waste Surcharge Act, 1991 N.D. Laws 784, § 2.
74. 1991 N.D. Laws 283, § 2. "Any moneys collected ... must be deposited in the
department operating fund . I..." d.
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used only for solid waste management activities.7
The new state law authorizing landfill fees requires the State
Department of Health and Consolidated Laboratories to consider
only the costs of application processing and the costs of a monitor-
ing and inspection program to ensure the permit fees are "rea-
sonable."'76  The new regulations by the Department require a
permit application processing fee,7 7 an annual permit fee,7  and
closure and post-closure financial assurance.79  Presumably, all
landfill operators will pass these increased costs on to the waste
generators.8 0
For closure, post-closure, and cleanup costs, the Department
estimates that each landfill operator should carry financial assur-
ance of approximately $4.95 per ton."' Compared to the one-hun-
dred dollar per ton tipping fees New Yorkers must pay,8 2 even
with all the new costs, North Dakota landfill costs are low, making
itself attractive to states like New York which have high tipping
fees.
At the end of 1992, fees became a state-wide issue. A voter
75. 1991 N.D. Laws 284, § 2. "The state treasurer shall place the moneys in the solid
waste management fund." Id.
76. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-29-07.1 (1991).
77. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-20-15-01 (1992). One-time application processing fees are
between $75 for waste haulers to $1,000 for a small municipal waste landfill ("average less
than twenty tons.., per day") and $20,000 for a large municipal landfill ("average more
than five hundred tons.., per day"). Id. at (IXa), (c), (f). See generally Regulatory Analysis
for Proposed Revisions to Article 33-20 of the N.D. ADMIN. CODE, at 4. "All permits are
assumed to have a duration of five years." Id. But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-29-07 (1991)
(providing that solid waste disposal permits "are for a term of not more than five years from
the date of issuance[;]" thus, permits may be issued for less than five years).
78. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-20-15-02 (1992). Annual fees range from $500 for a special
waste facility to $5,000 for a municipal waste facility "receiving on average more than five
hundred tons.., per day...." Id. at (2), (5). The code has a fiat fee of $500 for special waste
facilities regardless of facility size. Id. at (2).
79. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-20-14-02 (1992). Permit applicants must estimate closure
and post-closure care costs, and provide their own financial assurance instrument such as a
surety bond or insurance policy. Id. at § 33-20-14-03(2). The new rules, however, are not
applicable for hazardous waste, landfills closed after Oct. 9, 1993, agricultural waste,
individual household dumps on unplatted land, or resource recovery activity. N.D. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 33-20-01.1-02(lXa)-(e) (1992).
80. The Department calculates that the total permit fees for municipal solid waste
landfills will cost each household $11.86, $10.28, or $8.85 each month for disposal at a small,
medium, or large landfill respectively. Household accounts will also pay the monthly
twenty-cent surcharge. NDAC ADDENDUMS, supra note 53, at Attachment A. These
increased costs based on estimated tipping fees may not cover the true costs. Id. at n.1;
1991 N.D. Laws 284, § 2.
81. NDAC ADDENDUMS, supra note 53, at Attachment B; LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF
NORTH DAKOTA, MINUTES OF THE WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMITIEE, Jan. 14, 1992, at
Appendix "D." The North Dakota Waste Handlers Association testified before the
Committee and suggested several ways for financial assurance to be provided. Id. at 5.
However, none of the ways they suggested required them to provide the financial
assurance. See id. They suggested that the state assume the cost, or that the cost be
recovered by increasing tipping fees to $4.38 per ton. Id.
82. See supra note 2 for a discussion of high New York tipping fees.
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initiative in North Dakota, Measure 7, which would have imposed
higher fees on out-of-state waste than on in-state waste, lost by
only 1500 votes."' The 1993 legislative session included discus-
sions not only of a bill similar to the voter initiative, but also other
bills on fees and landfill criteria, some of which have been recom-
mended out of the interim Waste Management Committee. 4
Therefore, although the state's low fees and other rules might look
as if North Dakota is opting out of the solid waste wars, the legisla-
ture, if not concerned cities too, have started to close the state's
open invitation to waste from other states.
3. Minnesota
Minnesota's landfill regulations are considerably more compli-
cated than North Dakota's regulations. This is not surprising con-
sidering the greater population density, 5 greater amount of
garbage generated by a greater number of people, 6 and the great
number of known leaking landfills in Minnesota.8 7
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (PCA) regulates how
landfill permits are granted.As Like any solid waste management
facility permit application in Minnesota, a landfill operator must
submit an application. 9 If an operator wants to operate a mixed
municipal solid waste or municipal ash waste landfill, he or she
must submit "a preliminary application and detailed site evalua-
tion report."9 The application will be subject to public com-
ments,9 1 and may be subject to either public information
83. Sue Ellen Scaletta, Waste: Where Do We Go From Here?, GRAND FORKS HERALD,
Nov. 8, 1992, at Al; Sue Ellen Scaletta, Sawyer Landfill Wins State Permit, GRAND FORKS
HERALD, Aug. 6, 1993, at 6A.
84. For a listing of solid waste fees enacted in North Dakota in 1993, see supra note 60.
85. Minnesota and North Dakota have a population density of 54.95 people per square
mile and 9.23 people per square mile respectively. 1990 United States Census Data
(available in Westlaw database: CENDATA, at RN 08 12 01 104, stating that Minnesota has
4,375,099 people in 79,616.5 square miles, and North Dakota 638,800 people in 68,994.3
square miles).
86. Id.
87. In 1991, Minnesota had 60 sanitary landfills classified as hazardous-waste sites,
requiring $250 to $400 million each to clean up. Dean Rebuffoni, Too Much Waste and Too
Little Money; Cleanups May Be Delayed 5 To 8 Years, MINN. STAR TRIB., Dec. 30, 1991, at
lB. North Dakota has not yet completed a review of the state's sanitary landfills to
determine if any need cleanup. Telephone interview, William J. Delmore, Assistant
Attorney General and Director of Enforcement, Department of Health (Aug. 19, 1993).
88. MINN. R. § 7001, 7035 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
89. MINN. R. § 7001.3075(1) (1991 & Supp. 1992).
90. Id. The final application has exhaustive information requirements. See, e.g., MINN.
R. § 7001.3425 (1991) (providing demolition debris landfill requirements); MINN. R.
§ 7001.3475 (1991) (providing municipal sold waste landfill requirements); MINN. R.
§ 7001.3480 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (providing municipal solid waste ash landfill
requirements).
91. MINN. H. § 7001.0110 (1991).
hearings92 or a contested case hearing if someone objects to the
preliminary permit determination or the terms of the draft
permit.93
However, getting a permit is not a simple matter of comply-
ing with the PCA rules. The applicant must also have a satisfac-
tory "environmental impact statement" which "analyze[s] those
economic, employment and sociological effects that cannot be
avoided" if a landfill is built.94
Unlike North Dakota, Minnesota has two landfill area classifi-
cations: the "Metro Area," which consists of Minneapolis and St.
Paul, and the rest of the state. The Metro Area generally must
comply with stiffer criteria than other areas in the state. For
example, metropolitan counties" acquire solid waste disposal
buffer areas and must prepare an environmental impact statement
on any site selection for a future landfill in the buffer. 96 An envi-
ronmental impact statement must also be written for the local
council on any proposed landfill site permit.9" Most landfill opera-
tors in metropolitan areas must also pay a solid waste landfill fee.9
Additionally, since 1982, each metropolitan county was required
to prepare "a proposal to reduce to the greatest feasible and pru-
dent extent the need for and practice of land disposal of mixed
municipal solid waste." 99 If this provision does not prevent new
landfills from being built in the metro area, then section 473.848 of
Minnesota Statutes will.1"' Effective in 1990, no one may dispose
of solid waste in the metropolitan area unless the waste has been
certified as unprocessable, or unless the waste came from a
resource recovery facility and no other resource recovery facility
in the metro area could process it.10 '
92. MINN. R. § 7001.0120 (1991).
93. MINN. R. § 7001.0130 (1991).
94. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116D.04(2a) (West 1987). For example, the impact statements
would need to describe economic effects such as reduced local property values, and
employment effects such as the number of jobs lost or created by a landfill.
95. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.834 (West Supp. 1993). Counties include Anoka, Carver,
Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott and Washington. (historical and statutory notes).
96. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.833 (West Supp. 1992) (repealed by laws 1991).
97. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.823(3) (West 1977 & Supp. 1993).
98. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.843 (West 1977 & Supp. 1993). The fee is $2 per cubic
yard for any "mixed municipal solid waste disposal facility .... " Id. at (1Xa). Outside the
metro area, operators must pay the "Greater Minnesota landfill cleanup fee." MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 115A.923 (West Supp. 1993). The fee is also $2 per cubic yard for any "mixed
municipal solid waste disposal facility .. " Id. at la.
99. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.803(lb) (West Supp. 1993).
100. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.848 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that "[alfter
January 1, 1990, a person may not dispose of unprocessed mixed municipal solid waste at
waste disposal facilities located in the metropolitan area" if certain requirements are not
met).
101. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.848(1)-(2Xi) to (ii) (West Supp. 1993).
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In 1991, the four landfills in the metropolitan area were
expected to be full within three years.'0 2 Minnesota's stringent
regulations which make landfills difficult to construct 10 3 or expand,
and which require waste to be "processed" have forced operators
to transport waste outside of the Metro area and even outside the
state because waste managers find it cheaper to dispose of waste in
other states such as North Dakota. Thus, tough landfill regulations
can work like a Catch-22 by encouraging unsound waste manage-
ment practices like shipping waste to a state with less stringent
landfill criteria, and sending waste that might otherwise have been
recycled out of the state.
B. SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PLANS
1. Federal
The federal government offers states financial assistance to
implement solid waste plans.10 4 The plans are not mandated, but
with the opportunity to receive federal funding, most, if not all,
states have implemented a plan.
The plans do not require, but only encourage, "resource
recovery and conservation activities."'10 5 Most experts agree that
sound waste management has a hierarchy by first reducing the
amount of waste produced. Once waste is produced, it should be
reused or recycled, but if neither is possible, it should be inciner-
ated. As a last resort, waste should be buried in landfills.' The
federal government has not mandated a hierarchy, although it has
set national goals, such as a "25 percent source reduction and
recycling of municipal solid waste by 1992.107
102. Jim Adams, Mayor Says Burnsville Has Done Its Share, Objects to Landfill Plan,
MINN. STAR TRIB. Oct. 17, 1991, at 7B.
103. See MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, MINNESOTA SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT SELECTED ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ISSUES 33 (Cristine Leavitt and
Robert J. McCarron eds., 1992) [hereinafter MPC 1992 REPORT]. In July 1992, the MPC
had "only one [landfill] application in review for a new facility and this application [had]
been in review for six years." Id.
On the other hand, Minnesota courts have sometimes sided with those seeking permits
for potentially polluting activities. See, e.g., In re Combined Air and Solid Waste Permit No.
2211-91-OT-1, 489 N.W.2d 811,814 (Minn. App. 1992) (stating that "[a] generalized concern
about the possible environmental effect of a pollutant is insufficient to support denial of a
permit"); Northern States Power Co. v. Blue Earth County, 473 N.W.2d 920 (Minn. App.
1991) (stating that a utility must not be denied a license by a county board to open an ash
landfill based on unsubstantiated concerns over whether or not a liner would leak).
104. 40 C.F.R. § 256.04(d) (1992).
105. 40 C.F.R. § 256.30(a) (1992).
106. See, e.g., EDF, supra note 2, at 236. Using all of the waste management practices
together is commonly referred to as "'integrated' solid waste management." MPC 1992
REPORT, supra note 103, at 23. "[T]he waste hierarchy [is often referred to as] source
reduction, reuse, recycling, incineration, and landfilling." EDF, supra note 2, at 236.
107. PARTS 257/258 FINAL RULE, supra note 25, at 50,980.
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2. North Dakota
North Dakota enacted a solid waste management plan in the
1991 legislative session.108 The state's plan is based upon regions
of the state and not by counties, like Minnesota's county plan.' 0 9 A
1992 Interim Committee member tried to give large cities a board
of their own, or at least provide population-based representation
on the regional boards, but the attempt was aborted." 0 The
state's boards are only now starting their work by reviewing
existing landfills, but already, several boards have grandiose plans,
such as a proposed eight million dollar incinerator for the Grafton
region.
North Dakota, like the federal government, has no enforcea-
ble hierarchy of management methods, nor does it have any
required state resource reduction or recycling target
percentages.' 11
3. Minnesota
Minnesota has started to enforce a hierarchy of waste manage-
ment by establishing waste management standards that each
108. Solid Waste Reduction and Management Act, 1991 N.D. Laws 277 (codified in N.
D. CENT. CODE § 23-29 (1991)).
109. The Minnesota "Waste Management Act allow[s] counties to form solid waste
management district[s] to consolidate solid waste management under a unified local
government agency." MPC 1992 REPORT, supra note 103, at 24. However, as of July 1992,
no counties have made such a district. Id. Instead, many counties have formed solid waste
management groups, and depending on the type of "joint powers agreement" they make,
their members may retain independent decision ability. Id. "A [group] does not have full
legal standing as a separate unit of government, like a solid waste management district.
Overall, regional solid waste management groups organized under a joint powers
agreements are fairly unstable." Id.
110. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF NORTH DAKOTA, MINUTES OF THE WASTE
MANAGEMENT COMMITrEE, Sept. 18, 1992, at 10-12. State Sen. Jay Lindgren proposed a
bill to allow Fargo and other large cities to have either a solid waste management district of
their own, or to give large cities representation on their local regional board, but his motion
failed. Id. However, each board must now have a representative from each city in a district
with a population of more than ten thousand. H.B. 1057, 1993 N.D. Laws 111.
111. "There was much discussion during the [1993 North Dakota] session in regard to
whether the solid waste management districts are the best means for controlling
transportation, handling, and disposal of waste. A better means of regulation may be
strengthening of state and local regulatory and zoning requirements." DELMORE'S MEMO,
supra note 61, at 3 (analyzing H.C.R. 3008, which requires the Legislative Council to study
solid waste management problems and the effectiveness of the current districts, and to
make recommendations).
Other 1993 legislation involving solid waste management includes S.B. 2049 (requiring
the state Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of Health to "assess the
ability of each state agency, department, and institution to reduce the amount of solid waste
it generates and increase the amount of recycled products it uses"); and S.B. 2160 (requiring
a statewide committee to resolve conflicts between solid waste districts and ensure
consistent, "adequate and appropriate solid waste management capacity"). For more 1993
state laws, see supra note 60.
North Dakota has suggested target percentages to reduce municipal waste landfill
volumes. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-29-02(8).
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county and Metro plan must meet."12 Generally, the metro area
standards are higher. The metro standards range from requiring a
specific level of recycling 1 3 to reducing the amount of "problem
materials" disposed." 4 These standards have helped give Minne-
sota a "green" reputation. 1 5
C. THE EFFECT OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution gen-
erally prevents states from closing their borders to commerce
from another state." 6 The Supreme Court has decreed that trans-
porting garbage is "commerce" and is neither "innately harmful"
nor " 'valueless,' " which are the typical standards by which an
item of commerce can be stopped from entering a state." 7 If a
regulation overtly bars the free flow of garbage across state lines
for "simple economic protectionism," the regulation is invalid." 8
For example, in the case in which this doctrine against hinder-
ing garbage flow originated, the United States Supreme Court
found a proposed state statute invalid because it facially discrimi-
nated against out-of-state waste, even though it had legitimate leg-
112. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.02(b) (West Supp. 1993). " 'The following waste
management practices are in order of preference: (1) waste reduction and reuse; (2) waste
recycling; (3) composting of yard waste and food waste; (4) resource recovery through
mixed municipal solid waste composting or incineration; and (5) land disposal."' Id.
However, this "statute does not contain a legislative mandate that one waste management
practice be followed before another. While an alternative is preferred over those that
follow it, an alternative need not be exhausted before the next can be considered." In re
Combined Air and Solid Waste Permit No. 2211-91-OT-1, 489 N.W.2d 811, 816 (Minn. App.
1992).
113. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.551(2) (West Supp. 1993). Both counties inside
and outside the metropolitan area have escalating recycling goals. For example by
December 31, 1993, metro counties must recycle "a minimum of 35 percent by weight of
total solid waste generation" and 45 percent of the same by December 31, 1996. Id. at (2a).
Counties outside the metro area must meet targets of 25 percent and 30 percent by the
same dates. Id. at (2), (2a). Further, counties must ensure that all residents have an
opportunity to recycle with a local recycling center, curbside pickup, or a monthly pickup.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.552 (West Supp. 1993).
114. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115A.952 - 115A.97 (West Supp. 1993) (including
prohibitions on disposing major appliances in mixed municipal solid waste, a household
hazardous waste program, and prohibitions on selected toxins in packaging).
115. Cf. Tim W. Ferguson, Minnesota's Neighbors Go Shopping for Its Jobs, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 11, 1992, at A15. The "City & State, a trade paper for public officials, put Minnesota
in the top five states for 'green' spending and regulation, [putting it] in such dubious
company as California and New Jersey." Id.
116. See also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992). "[A] state (or one of its political subdivisions) may not
avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of
commerce through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the State itself." Id. at
2024. Solid waste management districts, which could be classified as another type of
subdivision of a state, would probably also fall under this rule.
117. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978).
118. Id. at 624.
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islative goals of resource preservation and economic protection. 19
If a statute opposing out-of-state waste is facially neutral, but
effectively discriminates against out-of-staters, then the statute will
be strictly scrutinized.12 0 To survive this test, a state must show
that a no less discriminatory method is available to achieve its local
benefits.' 2' If a state has a legitimate public interest, or local bene-
fit, and its regulation only incidentally 122 burdens trash flow, then
the balancing test in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,123 applies. Under
Pike, a regulation will be struck down if the burden on interstate
commerce is excessive.'2 4 States may discriminate against out-of-
staters if they meet the "market-participant" test. 125 Since 1990,
many states have lost challenges to their laws stopping waste
imports unless they could show the out-of-state waste was more
hazardous than in-state waste. 126 This test is nearly impossible to
pass without a novel argument. 12 7
119. Id. at 626-27.
120. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353
(1977) ("When discrimination against commerce of the type we have found is
demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits
flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate
to preserve the local interests at stake.").
121. E.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
122. For an example of a regulation to stop waste imports which would not be an
"incidental" effect, see Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, 985 F.2d 1381, 1387 (8th
Cir. 1993) (stating that an ordinance that would ban "40% of the Counties' solid waste...
from interstate commerce" is not an incidental burden on interstate commerce).
123. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). "Where [a] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits." Id. at 142.
124. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
125. Medical Waste Assoc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 966 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1992)
(interpreting Hughes v. Alexander Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)). The market
participant exception to the dormant commerce clause will allow a state to interfere with
interstate commerce as long as it is acting primarily as a market participant, and not as a
market regulator. Id. In Medical Waste, Baltimore "under the 'market participant'
exception ... could have built and operated the ... waste facility itself .... ." Id. at 151.
The City could then keep non-city waste out of a city facility whether the facility was city-
owned or public. Id.
126. Several states have lost challenges in their attempts to restrict the interstate
movement of waste. E.g., Southern State Landfill, Inc. v. Georgia Dep't of Natural
Resources, 801 F. Supp. 725, 731 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (invalidating state requirements that out-
of-state waste handlers have special plans, manifests, and inspections); Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Templet, 967 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming lower court's
decision which found Louisiana's prohibition against importation of foreign hazardous
wastes unconstitutional); Stephen D. Devito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid Waste
Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775, 781 (D.R.I. 1991), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991)
(finding that Rhode Island could not require in-state generated waste to be disposed of in-
state).
127. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 948 F.2d 405 (7th Cir.
1991), the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) argued that municipal ash should not be
allowed in nonhazardous landfills since it has toxic concentrations of hazardous materials.
Id. at 346. The Seventh Circuit ruled that ash is hazardous, ignoring EPA's new policy,
which exempts ash from section 3001(i). Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of
Chicago, 985 F.2d 303, 304 (7th Cir. 1993). The court stated that "the EPA has changed its
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Another obstacle for states trying to restrict waste imports is
the "intricate web of transactions"'2 between waste haulers and
disposers, as shown in Figure 2 on the following page.' 2 9 There is
such a large number of haulers transporting waste from many
states that any attempt to restrict their business is vigorously
opposed, given the profits130 and jobs' 3 ' at stake.
For more than 10 years, some members of Congress have
tried to give relief to states that want to stop waste coming in from
other states. Other members, however, from large cities and
states, like New York City and New Jersey with everything to gain
by shipping their waste out and avoiding future CERCLA-type lia-
bility, have defeated attempts to give other states the power to
stop or limit waste imports. 32
Thus, states cannot expect congressional help to limit the
power of the Commerce Clause. Instead, they can enact new
landfill regulations or fees to reduce the economic viability of new
landfills that specialize in importing waste, 33 impose restrictive
view so often that it is no longer entitled to the deference normally accorded an agency's
interpretation of the statute it administers." Id. (referring to REILLY'S ASH MEMO, supra
note 58). The Second Circuit has another view. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 931 F.2d. 211,213 (2nd Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
453 (1991) (affirming district court decision finding that the New York statute had excluded
municipal ash from hazardous waste regulations). The Supreme Court has not yet resolved
the split in the circuits. City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 113 S. Ct. 2992
(1993) (granting cert. to 985 F.2d 303).
Another argument to hinder interstate waste is to try to stop waste exports. C&A
Carbone, Inc., v. Clarkstown, 113 S. Ct. 2411 (1993) (granting cert. for challenge to a New
York town's ordinance requiring local disposal of local wastes).
128. 1990 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 46 (statement of Allen Moore, president,
National Solid Waste Management Association).
129. Figure 2 is taken from the National Solid Wastes Management Association's
pamphlet SPECIAL REPORT: INTERSTATE MOVEMENT OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE
(February 1992), p. 3.
130. Jeff Bailey, Municipal Waste-Disposal Investments Undermined by Federal Court
Rulings, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1993, at A9. The "U.S. trash hauling-and-dump business" is a
$25 billion industry. Id.
131. 1990 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 102, 108, 109 (statement of Allen Moore,
President National Solid Waste Management Association). Moore's association has 2,500
private waste hauling company members, id. at 102, who, presumably, provide many jobs.
Id.
132. In 1992, the Senate passed S. 2877 which would have given governors the
authority to ban out-of-state wastes or cap imports at 1991-92 levels, but the bill failed in the
House. S. 2877, 102nd Congress, 2d Sess. (1992).
In 1993, Senate Bill 439, was introduced, based on the previous year's failed bill. See
139 CONG. REC. S2094-S2095. The new bill would give counties or townships the power to
restrict waste imports and would give governors the power to limit waste imports. Id.
Senator Byron Dorgan of North Dakota held hearings for the Senate Commerce
Committee in North Dakota in June, 1993 to discuss the bill. Press Release from the Press
Office of Senator Byron Dorgan (May 24, 1993).
Other pending bills in the 103rd Congress (1993) to regulate interstate waste include
H.R. 105, H.R. 766, H.R. 963, H.R. 1052, H.R. 1076, and S. 822.
133. For example, North Dakota could enact more classifications of waste, such as for
different types of nonhazardous waste as in Pennsylvania and Texas regulations. See supra
note 45.
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Movements of MSW
(1989 - 1990)
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Movements
zoning on landfills, 134 give local communities or the governor the
right to reject a landfill or close it, encourage interstate compacts
to manage solid waste, 135 or adopt regulations based on economic
incentives.
North Dakota began regulating out-of-state waste with the
Ash Moratorium in 1991,136 but an attempted fee increase on
waste imports failed in 1992.137 Because of the current low fees
and relatively easy permit process (compared to a state like Minne-
sota), North Dakota may be a magnet for waste from all over the
United States unless it passes laws to discourage waste imports.
Given North Dakota's low population density, general geological
and climatological landfill suitability,1 38 high antipathy to any
"tax," 139 and the desire for new jobs, North Dakota cannot be
134. North Dakota recognizes the police power of cities to restrict landfills to certain
areas by zoning. See, e.g., City of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1977).
135. See, e.g. Michael R. Harpring, Out Like Yesterday's Garbage: Municipal Solid
Waste and the Need for Congressional Action, 40 CATH. U. L. REv 851, 886-91 (1991)
(advocating interstate compacts).
136. Supra note 62.
137. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
138. Municipal Services Corporation, the operator of the Sawyer Landfill (otherwise
known as the Echo Mountain Facility), declared that it chose the site "[alfter [an] extensive
search... because of low annual rainfall, its excellent clay base and very limited amounts of
subsurface water movement." Advertisement, Echo Mountain Facility: Some Plain Facts,
MINOT DAILY NEWS, Nov. 15, 1992, at D2.
139. It is common knowledge that in North Dakota, voters tend to reject most tax
increases. For example, the fees based on distance waste travels before disposal in Measure
7 appeared to have high voter acceptance before the election, but after the measure's
opponents blitzed the state, claiming the fees were really a "tax" on everyone, the measure
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expected to pass extremely stringent landfill or solid waste man-
agement regulations in the near future. 140
III. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT LAW AND THE SAWYER
LANDFILL
A. How MINNESOTA MUNICIPAL ASH MAY COME TO
NORTH DAKOTA
1 4 1
In early 1990, the Municipal Services Corporation (MSC)
bought a permitted and operating landfill outside of Sawyer, North
Dakota.' 42 The same year, MSC applied for a permit to accept
municipal incinerator ash as a permit modification to the existing
permit. In the summer of 1992, MSC started accepting industrial
waste allowed under the existing permit, but as of July 1993, MSC
has not yet been allowed by North Dakota to accept ash.
Hennepin County, one of Minnesota's metropolitan counties,
built an incinerator as part of its solid waste management plan. It
had few other options, since building another landfill in the metro
area was unrealistic given the stiff regulations and because Minne-
sota residents were afflicted with "Not-In-My-Backyard" syn-
drome. 143 With landfill capacity rapidly disappearing, the county
did not have time to establish sufficient recycling industries or
source reduction to absorb its growing amount of municipal waste.
Once the incinerator fired up in 1989, the county had trouble
finding a place to put the ash. The first problem was finding land-
failed-even though the fees would fall predominately on the large waste importers and not
North Dakotans. See also text accompanying note 83 supra.
140. But see supra note 60 (detailing new stringent regulations passed by the North
Dakota legislature.
North Dakota should not be looked upon as an innocent state which is letting itself be
dumped on without dumping on other states. Fallon County in eastern Montana is suing
Montana for the right to accept garbage from several towns in western North Dakota.
Fallon County v. State, No. DV 5546 (Mont. Fallon County Ct. filed Jan. 14, 1993). The
Coral Creek landfill in Fallon was constructed under the assumption that part of its costs
would be covered by fees generated from North Dakota imported waste. Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction, Fallon County v. State, No. DV 5546
(Mont. Fallon County Ct. filed Jan. 14, 1993).
141. Until recently, Municipal Services Corporation had a contract to dispose
Minnesota municipal ash in North Dakota. See supra note 10. Even though Minnesota ash
is not coming to North Dakota, the analysis explains some reasons why waste moves from
one state to another.
142. The information in this paragraph comes from a book published by the parent
company of MSC and an interview with MSC's Community Relations Coordinator.
MUNICIPAL SERVICES CORP., ECHO MOUNTAIN FACILITY, AUDIT INFORMATION BOOKLET
(USPCI ed., April 1993); Telephone Interview, Gloria A. David, Community Relations
Coordinator, Municipal Services Corp. (Aug. 11, 1993).
143. People often say, "Not In My Backyard" (NIMBY) when they do not want to live
near a landfill, or if they do not trust a proposed operator's safety record. EDF, supra note
2, at 23; Robert D. Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community,
SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY, Spring 1983, at 273, 275-76.
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fill space. The incinerator produces 100,000 tons of ash per year,
"enough to cover the Metrodome's playing surface nearly 19 feet
deep. ' 144 The county spent more than two million dollars con-
structing a landfill in Medina, Minnesota, but decided not to finish
it. 145 This is most likely due to concerns about the heavy metals
leaching out of the municipal waste ash. The county has a tempo-
rary contract with Waste Management of Illinois to ship the ash to
a nonhazardous landfill in Illinois.'16 If Municipal Services Corpo-
ration cannot get the North Dakota ash disposal permit, it has
offered to ship the waste to an MSC landfill in Utah as a temporary
measure, or build an eleven million dollar plant in Minnesota to
process the ash into pellets for use in construction or paving as a
long-term solution.147
The Sawyer site expansion has been delayed by the Ash Mora-
torium and permit litigation, and now the expansion depends
upon whether or not the North Dakota Department of Health will
approve an ash permit.148  The Department's approval depends
upon litigation, 49 the effect of the extension of the ash morato-
rium, and whether the state's Department of Health adopts stiffer
ash disposal laws.' 50
The short-term fix of shipping the waste to Illinois has difficul-
ties. Illinois' landfill space is running out, and the Environmental
Defense Fund has been challenging federal regulations which
allow municipal ash to be disposed in a Subtitle D (nonhazardous)
landfill, even though it has toxic levels which would normally place
it in a Subtitle C (hazardous) landfill.'
144. Steve Brandt, Hennepin to Vote on Paving Test: Experiment Offers Way to
Dispose of Incinerator Ash, MINN. STAR TRHI., April 7, 1992, at 8D (Metro. ed.).
145. Id.
146. The contract is worth twenty-five million dollars per year. Id.; Steve Brandt,
Hennepin County to Decide Today on Disposal of Ash, MINN. STAR TRIB., June 2, 1992, at
5B.
147. Brandt, supra note 144.
148. Sue Ellen Scaletta, Sawyer Landfill Wins State Permit, GRAND FORKS HERALD,
August 6, 1993, at 1A. MSC won a state permit to accept ash at the Sawyer landfill. Id.
Although MSC lost the contract to dispose of Minnesota's ash, MSC plans to find another
source of municipal ash. Telephone Interview, Gloria A. David, Community Relations
Coordinator, Municipal Services Corp. (Aug. 11, 1993).
149. In 1992, MSC challenged the moratorium's application to the proposed Sawyer
expansion. Municipal Serv. Corp. v. North Dakota Dep't of Health and Consol. Lab., 483
N.W.2d 560 (N.D. 1992) (concluding that the Department had denied due process to MSC
by the hearing process).
150. See supra note 61 (describing the moratorium extension and new ash regulations).
151. Although neither MSC nor Waste Management is a party to the Environmental
Defense Fund ash litigation, Hennepin County would be affected since their Illinois short-
term landfill is in the jurisdiction of the litigation. See supra note 127.
1993] NOTE
598 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:575
B. THE IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA AND MINNESOTA
FROM WASTE EXPORTS
By allowing municipal ash to come into North Dakota, the
state may suffer economically. The future costs of monitoring and
cleanup should be covered by the state's new financial assurance
landfill regulations. However, as federal and state pollution stan-
dards are stiffened, the financial assurances of today may be insuffi-
cient, and the state's taxpayers will ultimately be liable for cleanup
and monitoring costs.' 5 2  Additionally, North Dakota will lose
potential income because it charges lower fees than Minnesota for
hauling and tipping in general. 153 North Dakotans will suffer such
costs due to decreased property values for land near and under
landfills, for contaminated soil, wells and aquifers,15 4 and for the
stigma of a dumping ground state. Beyond costs, areas of the state
could become dependent on the waste disposal business if it
becomes a dominant industry in areas of the state.15 5
On the other hand, Minnesota will suffer a great cost if it con-
tinues to export waste. A University of Minnesota law student
forcefully argued that Minnesota has not been able to sustain the
best hierarchy of waste management practices because cheap
interstate waste transport undermines the other disposal meth-
ods.15 6 For example, an incinerator requires a large constant vol-
ume of trash to run profitably.' 5 7 Thus, a recycling facility may be
disadvantaged by a shortage of material if a waste management
152. When a landfill has leaked, there is often intense litigation between potentially
liable parties over who pays cleanup costs. THOMAS W. CHURCH & ROBERT T. NAKAMURA,
CLEANING UP THE MESS: IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES IN SUPERFUND (1993) (detailing
difficulties with Superfund implementation). Current North Dakota landfill rules only
require landfill operators to estimate closure costs or to post a bond or other financial
instrument such as a trust account. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 33-20-14-03 (1992). The operator
need not indemnify the state for any actual future cleanup costs. Once a facility is closed,
the potentially responsible party could be the state if it failed to monitor the landfill, or
even a local construction company if it built the landfill incorrectly. But see supra note 60
(describing new financial assurance state law based on H.B. 1445 and S.B. 2214).
153. If North Dakota imposed more landfill fees and assessed more fees, such as fees for
environmental impact statements, or costs for public hearings, then the state and its
residents would earn more income from landfills.
154. The Sawyer ash landfill site originally stood over an aquifer, but MSC has since
relocated the site away from the aquifer. Sue Ellen Scaletta, New Rules Could Dash Hopes
of Trash Merchants, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Aug. 1, 1993, at lB.
155. A landfill with ash could produce some benefits such as jobs, tax revenue, and
abandoned mine reclamation. The Sawyer landfill is built on an old coal strip mine and
spoils area which had been unsuitable for agriculture. Telephone Interview, Gloria A.
David, Community Relations Coordinator, Municipal Services Corp. (Aug. 11, 1993).
Converting a strip mine and spoils piles to an area capable of supporting plant life is a
benefit to the state and residents near the landfill. See infra note 182 (describing the
planned landfill cap, including three feet of soil).
156. Mesnikoff, supra note 20.
157. See Bailey, supra note 130. A large incinerator built to handle "approximately 1.2
million tons of trash a year ... [must] take [in] at least 624,000 tons a year, [or else] it can't
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district must dedicate waste to an incinerator. Likewise, if a com-
munity builds an incinerator, it is usually financed by a public
bond issue of millions of dollars, which must be paid off with inter-
est. This money might otherwise have been spent to encourage
recycling and source-reduction industries, instead of incinera-
tors.158 Finally, with the expected stiffening of state and federal
pollution standards, the incinerator will probably require continu-
ous expensive updating-simply more money up the
smokestack.'159
IV. A CASE FOR INCENTIVE-BASED INTERSTATE WASTE
REGULATIONS
Since Congress is unlikely to give states the power to limit
waste imports, states will need to find their own solutions to inter-
state waste problems to avoid the costs that Minnesota has already
incurred and the costs that North Dakota may incur. States might
be able to make interstate compacts to control waste movement
regionally. However, given the cost of waste disposal in states
such as New York and New Jersey, this solution is also unlikely to
succeed nationally as long as a state such as New York can send its
waste to a state with cheaper landfill costs. States might lobby for
a national hierarchy of waste management practices, but national
standards have a tendency to stifle the creativity and flexibility
run at full efficiency and could have trouble generating enough revenue to service [its]
bond debt." Id.
158. A "survey of 18 states in the Northeast and Midwest found that planned state
spending on incineration from 1989 to 1995 is eight to ten times higher than for recycling."
EDF, supra note 2, at 145. On the other hand, incinerators do have some positive effects.
NATIONAL SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ASSOC., AT A GLANCE: RESOURCE RECOVERY IN
NORTH AMERICA (1991) at 2 (discussing how garbage incinerators save oil and reduce air
pollution caused by oil or coal-fired power or steam plants).
159. In addition to the effects on the two states from ash movement, there are some
implications for General Motors, the primary industrial waste disposer currently at Sawyer.
Automobile manufacturers normally rely on their suppliers for waste reduction; however,
they are still large producers of waste that could be reduced. For example, automobile
manufacturers could demand that their suppliers reduce the amount of their wastes in
producing air conditioner condensers, paints, wastewater sludge, and plastic foam. The
automobile industry could retool the engines and other components to favor longer life of
the cars and components and further reduce wastes. However, most of the production
processes do not need the expensive disposal for wastes classified as hazardous; thus, as long
as it is cheaper to dump the industrial waste in North Dakota than it would be to retool and
redesign for source reduction and maximum recycling, the Sawyer landfill will continue to
import General Motor's waste. Pollution Prevention Case Studies Compendium, United
States Environmental Protection Agency, pp. 68-70 (April 1992).
In contrast, when industries or organizations are encouraged to recycle or reduce their
waste, particularly hazardous waste, there have been successes. See, e.g., William H. Parker,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Environment), Department of Defense Initiatives,
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE OF THE 1990'S, Proceedings [of the] International
Conference on Pollution Prevention: Clean Technologies and Clean Products, 493 (1990)
(describing military efforts to reduce hazardous materials).
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needed and desired by the states. States could also try to stiffen
their own regulations with stricter landfill criteria, stricter waste
management hierarchies, or restrictive zoning, but this would
most likely result in a regulations war similar to an arms race in
which the cost of the regulations could outstrip any actual need for
regulations.
A more effective way to improve waste management would
be to change RCRA and state waste regulations from the current
strictly "command and control" regulations to more "incentive-"
or "market-based" regulations. "Command and control" regula-
tions require specific activities to meet specific standards, giving
polluters such as waste disposers little flexibility.' 60 "Incentive-
based" regulations encourage polluters to reduce their pollution
by allowing them to look for efficient ways to reduce pollution. 6'
There are four major types of incentive-based regulations:
tradable permits, fees and taxes, deposit and refund, and risk
communication. 162
A. TRADABLE PERMITS1 6 3
Under this system, North Dakota could issue a set number of
permits allowing a holder to pollute. The permits could be for
160. Robert W. Hahn, and Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for Environmental
Protection: Integrating Theory and Practice, AM. ECON. REV. 464, 464 (May 1992).
161. Id. ("[Plolicy instruments for achieving environmental objectives [can be divided]
into two categories: those that provide firms with little flexibility in achieving goals (so-
called 'command and control' approaches) and those that provide firms with greater
flexibility and incentives to look for more effective ways of making sustained environmental
progress (so-called market-based mechanisms)."). In the case of MSC and the Sawyer
landfill site, MSC has spent time and money trying to keep the landfill criteria and fees as
low as possible under the current command and control regulations. However, if MSC had
incentives to build a Subtitle C (hazardous) landfill, most likely the North Dakota
Department of Health and residents concerned about landfill leaking would have approved
the site and MSC probably could have avoided all the permit litigation and public hearings,
and campaigning against the voter initiative to increase its tipping fees. Although the cost
of building a Subtitle C landfill as opposed to a Subtitle D landfill would not be offset by
MSC's litigation and lobbying expenses so far, the difference could be offset perhaps by
other savings, such as reduced insurance premiums.
162. Id. at 465. There are also other incentive-based strategies such as eliminating
subsidies, and reducing barriers to market activity. Id. States could also encourage
innovation by reducing their penalties for pollution that might be a result of innovation.
For example, if a landfill operator tried out a new way to separate heavy metals from ash,
(but the process allowed some metals to get by) and later some metals leached into a local
aquifer, he could face one to ten years in prison and fines up to $1 million under Minnesota
law. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.671 subd. 3 (West Supp. 1993). In North Dakota, he
could face lawsuits for damages, see N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-40-06, -11 (1976 & Supp. 1991),
and could be fined up to $1,000 per day for permit violations. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-29-12
(1991).
For an excellent analysis of economics and environmental policy, see WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATEs, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1988).
163. Tradable emission permits for such facilities as coal-fired electricity plants are an
example of existing tradable permits.
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permission to build a landfill, permission for households to send a
certain amount of waste to a landfill, or even permission to send a
certain amount of unrecycled garbage to landfills.
For example, suppose North Dakota required all residents to
recycle 30% of their garbage. If Bismarck residents set up a
household recycling program and recycled 40% of their garbage,
they would have a 10% "credit" to sell. Suppose Jamestown could
only manage to recycle 20% of its garbage. Jamestown would
then either have to buy the Bismarck 10% credit, or the credit of
another city, or perhaps pay a tax to cover their recycling shortfall.
Allowing the permits to be traded between cities or counties
in the state would help establish a true value for the permit.16 4
Without a market establishing a true price on pollution, the cost of
pollution may be more easily externalized by transferring the cost
from the polluter to other people or entities. For example, in
Hennepin County, residents pay a fee for garbage pickup, and the
county pays the cost of building and running the incinerator. The
county pays twenty-five million dollars per year to bury the ash in
Illinois, an amount which may not cover all future monitoring and
cleanup costs of the landfill. The residents directly pay only the
cost of taking their waste to the incinerator, and not necessarily
the costs incurred afterwards (unless the garbage pickup fee
includes the associated landfill costs). These later costs are exter-
nalized by Hennepin residents by being imposed on Illinois resi-
dents. Thus, the true costs of polluting are not charged or
considered by the polluters.165
To ensure a permit trading system would not merely perpetu-
ate current pollution levels, but rather work to reduce pollution
levels, conditions must be tied to the permit.166 The permits must
specify that a polluter must meet certain pollution standards, and
must be encouraged to reduce pollution. Disposers could also be
offered specific monetary incentives to reduce pollution from
landfills as a condition of their permit.
164. A permit trading system could run between states in a compact, between all
states, or between nations.
165. See Roberts, infra note 177 (calculating the amount of money people will pay to
keep a landfill away from their residence); William M. Petrovic & Bruce L. Jaffee,
Measuring the Generation and Collection of Household Waste in Cities, URB. AFFAIRS Q.,
Dec. 1978, at 229 (demonstrating city residents reduce the amount of garbage they put out
on the curb for collection if charged a fee based on quantity of garbage put out).
166. Cf. Terry M. Dinan, Implementation Issues for Marketable Permit: A Case Study
of Newsprint, J. REG. ECON., March 1992, at 71-87 (discussing necessary conditions to a
marketable permit scheme to improve newspaper recycling).
NOTE
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
1. Minnesota's Tradable Permit Proposal
Minnesota's Pollution Control Agency (PCA) has proposed a
tradable permit system for the state's solid waste. 167 Each year the
PCA would determine the total solid waste disposal allowed in the
state. The state would then issue a specific number of "certificates
of disposal" to cover the total allowable disposal amount. Every
solid waste disposal facility in the state (recyclers, incinerators, and
landfills) would need certificates of disposal to cover the amount of
waste they dispose each year.'16  The PCA would sell certificates
of disposal to any waste management facility that recycles, based
upon the amount of material it had recycled in the past year and at
a price which only covers the agency's administrative costs.' 69 All
other waste disposers, such as landfill operators and incinerator
operators, 170 would need to purchase certificates of disposal from
the recyclers to cover their own disposal amounts. The PCA
assumes these other disposers would pay more for the certificates
of disposal than the recyclers because they are not allowed to par-
ticipate in the first sale. Thus, the recyclers could sell the certifi-
cates of disposal at a profit. The profit they earn is a subsidy since
it is money they have received from the state which others are
unable to receive.17 1
This tradable permit system, displayed below in Figure 3,172
would create incentives favoring a sound waste management hier-
archy. All waste disposers would have an incentive to start or
increase recycling efforts in order to receive the certificates of dis-
posal subsidy. 73 Recyclers could earn money from certificates of
disposal sales by merely increasing their amount of recycling,17 4
167. MPC 1992 REPORT, supra note 103, at Al15-A127. The proposal was prepared
for the Minnesota Legislative Commission on Waste Management. The permit scheme
originated with Professor Theodore Graham-Tomasi from Michigan State University's
Agricultural Economics Department. Id. at Al15.
168. The proposal does not clearly define "dispose." The authors admit that details
must be worked out. For the purposes of this discussion on the proposal, "disposal" will
mean "the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any waste
into or on any land or water so that the waste or any constituent thereof may enter the
environment or be emitted into the air, or discharged into any waters, including ground
waters." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.03(9) (West 1987 & Supp. 1992). This definition
includes landfills, compost facilities and incinerators.
169. MPC 1992 REPORT, supra note 103, at A 117. The state would not give away any
free permits in order to avoid "free rider" problems. Id. at Al18.
170. The proposal suggested that waste haulers and other waste handlers might be
required to have certificates. Id. at A120.
171. See id. at Al 17 (noting that "[tihe net proceeds of the sales would become the
recyclers' subsidies for the year").
172. Figure 3 is based upon an illustration in the MPC 1992 REPORT, supra note 103, at
All7.
173. Id. at A119.
174. Id.
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even if the recycling itself is not profitable. Landfills and incinera-
tors would be encouraged to reduce the amount of trash they are
burying or burning because every ton they burn or bury would
need to be covered by a purchased certificate of disposal.'7 5 The
subsidy would be especially helpful for struggling new recycling
businesses because certificate sales could give them cash to
grow.176
Despite the potential benefits, the proposed tradable permit
system has a few flaws. First, it makes no distinction between haz-
ardous waste and nonhazardous waste. A recycler, incinerator, or
landfiller will benefit equally by reducing disposal amounts or
increasing recycling efforts, regardless of which type of waste is
affected. This does not give operators incentives to manage haz-
ardous waste more efficiently. In addition, the proposal does not
give any incentives to those who follow other sound practices, such
as manufacturing products with fewer toxic components.
Second, the permit scheme ignores external costs of landfills.
Landfill operators have no incentives to stop imposing the costs of
pollution on others such as nearby property owners whose prop-
erty values go down when a landfill is built.177 The scheme also
175. MPC 1992 REPORT, supra note 103, at A119.
176. Id. The proposal suggests that any start-up recycling business, which would not
have a past year of data on the amount of material it had recycled, could post a
performance bond to assure it would recycle what it planned in order to get certificates to
sell for its first year of operation. Id. at A120-21.
177. See Roland K. Roberts, et al., Estimating External Costs of Municipal Landfill
Siting through Contingent Valuation Analysis: A Case Study, S.J. AGRIC. ECON., Dec. 1991,
at 155. Through a controlled study, the authors found that an average household in a rural
Tennessee community of 798 households would pay $227 per year to keep a proposed
municipal waste landfill from being built near them. Id. at 156-58. The study shows a high
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ignores the similar external costs from incinerators.
Third, the proposal makes no provision for the state to profit
monetarily by the certificate of deposit resale market, nor does it
give the state the ability to manipulate the resale price. As an
analogy, many world governments participate in currency
exchange markets in order to profit by currency speculation, and
to manipulate the value of currencies. For example, Mexico has
two currency rates for the peso: one "fixed" by the government,
available only for certain special entities, and without a free mar-
ket; the other currency rate is "floating" and applies to everyone
else. The Mexican Central Bank monitors the price of the Mexi-
can peso every day, and buys and sells pesos not only to profit by
"buying low and selling high," but also to force the "floating" price
up or down according to government policies. Minnesota's PCA
could treat the certificates of disposal like a currency with a fixed
price (the offering price to recyclers) and a floating price (the price
in the resale market for waste disposers). By participating in the
resale market, the PCA could not only profit but also manipulate
the price. If the floating price was too low (below the administra-
tive costs or too low to induce increased recycling), then the PCA
could restrict the number of certificates of disposal issued to create
a scarcity and perhaps drive up the floating price. If the floating
price was too high (such that disposers might resort to dump ille-
gally without certificates of disposal), then the PCA could issue
more certificates of disposal to recyclers to create a surplus of cer-
tificates of disposal and drive the price down.
correlation between the amount of money a household is willing to pay and their amount of
education and income. Id. at 158.
All respondents who gave bids of $500 or more had household incomes of
$30,000 or more and had attended at least some college, with 79 percent being
college graduates. Similarly, 76 percent of respondents who gave bids of $50 or
less had household incomes of less than $20,000 and 68 percent had attended no
college.
Id. Others willing to pay more money included those living closer to the proposed site and
those who depended on wells for drinking water. Id. at 159.
The median household incomes in 1989 in Minnesota and North Dakota are $30,909
and $23,213, respectively. 1990 United States Census Data, 1990 CPH L 88 (available in
WESTLAW, CENDATA database). The percent of persons 25 years and over with at least a
bachelor's degree in Minnesota and North Dakota is 21.8% and 18.1%, respectively. Id.
Thus, according to the study, Minnesotans ought to be willing to pay more than North
Dakotans to assure landfills are not in their backyards. In fact, North Dakota uses a "dam-
age-avoidance" (cleanup cost) model to value the external costs of landfills, which the
study's author rejects as a valid method to value landfills' external costs. Roberts, supra note
177. See text accompanying note 81 supra (annual fees are based on financial assurance for
cleanup which generally averages to $4 per year per household).
For an excellent analysis of the perception of environmental risk by a culture, see
MARY DOUGLAS AND AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982). For a comprehen-
sive analysis of the issues involved in designing environmental polices accounting for differ-
ences in income distribution, see BAUMOL, supra note 162, at 235-56.
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Fourth, keeping with the currency market analogy, the certifi-
cates of disposal resale price may never be able to achieve a free
market price, given the small number of participants in the mar-
ket. The proposal only refers to recyclers and other solid waste
management facilities as participants in the resale market. There
are fewer than one hundred solid waste management facilities in
Minnesota. l"" Many of these facilities recycle, landfill, and inciner-
ate. Thus, landfill operators who also recycle would try to keep the
resale price low to avoid paying high prices for the certificates
they would need for their landfill operation.'7 9
Fifth, the greatest flaw in the PCA proposal is that if Minne-
sota increases the cost of the state's landfills by requiring certifi-
cate of disposal purchases, then more waste will flow out of state
exacerbating the problem of interstate transport.' s0 The agency
seems to think it can handle the problem by requiring transfer sta-
tions and solid waste haulers to buy certificates of disposal, to trans-
port waste to an out-of-state landfill only if it meets the
Minnesotan liner criteria, and to allow "out-of-state facility opera-
tors to buy CD [I [certificates]."' 8'1
2. Tradable Permits and the Sawyer Landfill
Considering the Sawyer situation, in which the out-of-state
facility exceeds Minnesota's requirements,8 2 waste exporters
would be likely to argue the state had violated the Commerce
Clause by requiring them to purchase the certificates. They could
also argue the certificate program is discriminatory because the
Sawyer landfill would not be required to purchase certificates of
disposal unless North Dakota also required it.
The proposal is faulty in that it assumes that a waste importer
like MSC would buy certificates, see its profits decline and then
178. MPC 1992 REPORT, supra note 103, at 13. Minnesota has 74 "solid waste
management facilities" composed of sanitary landfills, mass burn incinerators, refuse driven
fuel burn incinerators, municipal solid waste compost facilities, and refuse driven fuel
facilities. Id.
179. The PCA estimates no need for municipal solid waste landfills in the year 2003,
which would drive the certificate price lower. Id. at 1 (figure 1).
180. Id. at A124-A125.
181. Id. at A125. Allowing out-of-state facility operators to participate in the certificate
resale market and the recycler fixed price sales may work to eliminate the problem of a
market with too few participants for market efficiency.
182. MSC already has planned a double liner for the Sawyer landfill to handle
Hennepin County, Minnesota municipal solid waste ash. These liners are beyond what
North Dakota and Minnesota regulations require. Additionally, MSC will provide "two
leachate detection and collection systems," and a "landfill cap... consist[ing] of three feet
of clay, a 60 mil HDPE liner, a foot of sand, a filter fabric, one foot of gravel, and three feet
of soil." Advertisement, Echo Mountain Facility: Some Plain Facts, MINOT DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 15, 1992, at D2.
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stop or reduce ash exports from Minnesota. Why would MSC rush
to pay a Minnesota recycler for a certificate of disposal that North
Dakota does not require to bury ash? On the other hand, the
PCA's idea might work if it required the ash hauler, Union Pacific
(MSC's parent company), 18 3 to buy certificates of disposal before
shipping out the ash. If the price of the certificates of disposal was
very high, then the ash transport might be unprofitable, ultimately
realizing the certificate program's goal of better waste
management.
Besides ash, the Sawyer landfill also disposes of industrial
waste. The landfill accepts industrial waste from one hundred
General Motors' factories all around the United States.18 4 If Gen-
eral Motors had many plants in Minnesota, then the PCA proposal
might have some effect on the industrial waste shipments into
Sawyer. However, with waste from one hundred factories around
the country, the Minnesota certificates of disposal would have a
negligible effect on GM's shipments to Sawyer.
A final flaw in the PCA proposal which may be illustrated by
the Sawyer landfill is the fungibility of waste and the related
enforcement problems. Suppose MSC received a North Dakota
ash permit and started accepting Hennepin County ash and
municipal solid waste ash from other states. Also, assume some
GM waste such as sludge comes from Minnesota. Although Sawyer
has individual structures (or "cells") for GM's waste, Minnesota
waste could mix with other states' waste. Minnesota sludge could
mix with other states' sludge. How could Minnesota inspectors
insure that their ash and their sludge were covered by a certificate
of disposal? Would they require the ash and sludge to be packaged
(probably with a recycled-plastic-biodegradable-garbage bag)?
Could Minnesota require MSC to keep all the state's waste sepa-
rated according to place of origin?
If Minnesota intends to enforce a sound waste management
hierarchy for their waste by a certificate of disposal scheme,
whether it stays in Minnesota or leaves the state, then all states
and all solid waste facilities receiving Minnesota waste must par-
ticipate in either the certificate of disposal program or some other
183. Municipal Services Corporation is a part of USPCI which is a unit of the Union
Pacific Corporation.
184. Sue Ellen Scaletta, CM's Sludge Coming to N.D., GRAND FORKS HERALD, July 18,
1992, at Al (noting that the industrial waste consists mainly of paint sludge and other
wastewater treatment byproducts); Telephone interview, Gloria A. David, Community
Relations Coordinator, Municipal Services Corp. (Aug. 11, 1993) (explaining that MSC
began accepting General Motors' industrial waste in the summer of 1992).
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tradable permit scheme. A nationwide "certificate of disposal
market" could operate with some market mechanisms of other
tradable commodities which would help to determine the true
value of certificates of disposal. For example, the Chicago Board of
Trade has already held auctions for air pollution rights and is plan-
ning a futures contract market.'15 A national market would help
to promote the goals of the National Environmental Policy Act to
protect the environment. If foreign waste handlers were able to
participate in the market, perhaps the days of the garbage barges
sailing around the world trying to find a place to accept their cargo
might be over.186
B. TAXES AND FEES
Regulating polluting activities by taxes and fees poses difficul-
ties. For example, in order to discourage the amount of waste
dumped from out-of-state, North Dakota could raise its landfill
fees. However, as long as out-of-state dumpers like Minnesota find
dumping cheaper in North Dakota than elsewhere even after
transport costs, then North Dakota will be a dumping ground.
Another difficulty is how to determine the price of the tax or
fee. A leading authority in environmental policy suggests that
"marketable emissions permits" (similar to the Minnesota market-
able permit scheme) offer some advantages over state-set taxes.'1 7
A price set by the market instead of an administration or authority
can adjust more quickly to price inflation, economic growth, and
other uncertainties.188
185. Jeffrey Taylor, CBOT Plan for Pollution-Rights Market Is Encountering Plenty of
Competition, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1993, at Cl (pointing out the brokerage firms have
developed an "off-exchange pollution-rights market" using instruments such as "swap"
agreements). Cf. Ted Gregory, Office Paper Recycling Unfolds a New Stack of Problems,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 16, 1993, § 2, at 2 (NW ed.) (explaining that "the Chicago Board of Trade is
developing an electronic trading system that for the first time would permit recycled
materials to be bought and sold on a centralized cash market").
186. See supra note 5 (discussing various states' efforts to stop waste imports). On
January 25, 1993, the vice president of a company "that spent two years trying to dump
Philadelphia incinerator ash on three continents, was indicted... 'for allegedly lying (to] a
1988 federal court .... "' Toxic Ash: Firm's VP Indicted for Lying About Dumping,
GREENWIRE, Jan. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Greenwire File. "The
indictment alleges the ash was dumped in the Atlantic and Indian oceans while the ship was
traveling between Philadelphia, Yugoslavia, and Singapore from 3/88 to 11/88. [The VP]
was indicted... on charges he lied to a federal grand jury that the ash was not dumped at
sea." Id.
For an analysis of marketable permits in an international market, see BAUMOL, supra
note 162, at 278-83.
187. See BAUMOL supra note 162, at 156, 177-89.
188. Id. at 178.
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C. DEPOSIT AND REFUND
In order to encourage bottle recycling, many states require
bottle distributors to pay a refund to people who return the bot-
tles. To discourage landflling, waste management districts operat-
ing a local town dump could refund a portion of each resident's
trash pick-up bill if residents recycled a certain amount of garbage.
D. RISK COMMUNICATION
Under this system, people will presumably reduce their pol-
luting activities if they know the actual costs and risks associated
with their disposal practices. This assumes information effi-
ciency,18 9 and a responsive population. Given the fact that the
long and short-term hazards of landfills are not sufficiently known,
this method is not likely to have much effect on its own.
V. CONCLUSION
North Dakota may be exploited by Minnesota, which will not
deal with its own municipal solid waste ash, and by General
Motors, who now finds it economical to ship in waste from more
than one hundred plants. The North Dakota Legislature has
reacted to the waste imports by stiffening regulations to increase
the costs for those who dump other states' waste in North Dakota.
Residents nearly passed a fee on large waste importers, and
pressed the Department of Health to restrict a large commercial
waste importer. North Dakota is now involved in the Interstate
Waste War and can be expected to take a more protectionist
stance, or perhaps work with other states to achieve a sound waste
management hierarchy.
States will probably be limited for a long time by the Com-
merce Clause and other constitutional restrictions. A state without
completely effective barriers against waste imports, like North
Dakota, should not wait for a federal solution, but should stiffen its
landfill criteria to equal all others in the nation; or better yet,
change its regulations to include economic incentives to reduce
landfills or their polluting potential.9 ° If a state allows itself to be
189. "Information efficiency" occurs when all players in a market understand all
information they need to know in order to make decisions on their activities. A nationwide
certificate program could create sufficient information efficiency by involving a large
number of participants who would benefit by sharing information. For example, wheat
traders benefit by sharing world price and weather information.
190. Telephone interview, William J. Delmore, Assistant Attorney General and
Director of Enforcement, Department of Health (Aug. 19, 1993). The Department of
Health has recommended to the E.P.A. that it look at some incentive-based requirements
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NOTE
a dumping ground, it can expose itself to another's inevitable
CERCLA-type liability, hurt its solid waste plans and those of
other states, and thwart the national environmental policy by act-
ing as a facilitator for bad waste management.
Alice Jean Mansell
under which people and companies will benefit from going beyond the statutory and
regulatory requirements. Id. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-08(38) (1993) (allowing local
authorities to grant property tax exemptions for pollution abatement improvements).
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EDITOR'S NOTE:
The following piece is a "Viewpoint," a new feature of the NORTH
DAKOTA LAW REVIEW. Viewpoints, short opinion pieces about re-
cent legal developments affecting North Dakota and its residents,
are intended to stimulate thoughtful discussion throughout North
Dakota's legal community.
The NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW thanks Professor Thomas M.
Lockney for dreaming up our new Viewpoint feature and for writ-
ing the first of what we hope will be many to come. The NORTH
DAKOTA LAW REVIEW invites Viewpoint submissions and re-
sponses for possible publication.

